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I. INTRODUCTION

In the past twelve years, both scholarly commentators and federal
courts, including the present Supreme Court, have increasingly criticized the antitrust jurisprudence of the Warren Court.1 As a number
of commentators have noted, the antitrust philosophy of the Burger
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law, J.D., 1975, Ohio State
University.
1. See generally R. Bornc THE ANTTRusT PARAnox (1978); R. PosNFA ANTITRUST LAW:
AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
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Court differs vastly from that of its predecessor.2 In antitrust cases,
the Burger Court favors the economic "efficiency" approach of the
"Chicago School" of antitrust law rather than the "populist" ap3
proach espoused in Warren Court decisions.
One of the "populist" antitrust concepts developed by the Warren
Court is competition on the merits.4 Competition on the merits is
competition by a firm on the basis of product or service innovation,
quality, and value. This concept has received the same severe criticism as the Warren Court's general antitrust philosophy. For example, a former law professor and Antitrust Division official recently
dismissed the Warren Court's emphasis on competition on the merits
by declaring " '[c]ompetition on the merits' has no commonly understood meaning outside the [Warren] Court's opinions. . . . In sum,
the 'competition on the merits' extolled by the [Warren] Court in its
tying decision has little relationship to the economic values endorsed
by [the Burger Court]. ' '
While the Burger Court was beginning to pay homage to Chicago
School economic "realism," another development was occurring the decrease in the competitiveness of American products vis-a-vis
their foreign competition." As this article will discuss, one of the reasons for the non-competitive position of American products is a lack
of emphasis on quality and value by American businesses. 7 As one
commentator put it, "[w]e're losing the battle for competitive survival because all too often, 'Made in U.S.A.' has become a symbol for
'second rate.' "s
This article will assert that an antitrust policy emphasizing competition on the merits is not a romantic vestige of populism, but
rather is an important tool in winning the battle for competitive survival. Specifically, questions of antitrust law and policy should, at
least in part, be resolved by determining whether the proposed answers to those questions have the effect of forcing manufacturers to
compete through product quality and innovation. More importantly,
2. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph
of the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 319; Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudenceof the
Burger Court's Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1982);
Redlich, The Burger Court and The Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1979).
3. See Gerhart, supra note 2, at 319; Markovits, The Burger Court Antitrust and Eco-

nomic Analysis, in

THE BURGER COURT

182-84 (V. Blasi ed. 1983).

4. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
5. Baker, The Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the GordianKnot, 66
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1268, 1274 (1980).
6. See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
8. Reich, 'Made in U.S.A.'-A Label for Second Rate?, AcRoss THE BOARD, Nov. 1980, at
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courts should scrutinize claims of "economic efficiency" which are
currently used to justify restraints on trade. Courts should determine
whether these restraints actually lead to enhanced product quality
and performance or whether they merely boost short-run profits by
encouraging firms to compete through marketing, false product differentiation, and dealership networks.
II.

AMERICAN PRODUCTS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

In the past twenty years the market shares of American products
faced with major foreign competition have declined sharply. The
American automobile industry is the most widely noted example of
an economic sector battered by foreign competition. Between 1961
and 1981, imported vehicles increased their share of the United
States passenger car market from 6.4 percent to 27.3 percent.9 The
loss of competitive position is not limited to "mature" or "smokestack" industries.10 In 1964 American firms had a 100 percent share
of the domestic color television set market. By 1977 sales by Japanese firms accounted for a 37 percent share of that market.1 An even
more dramatic example is the market for 64K computer chips. In this
market which is "arguably a bellwether of industrial high technology" Japanese manufacturers have amassed a 70 percent share of the
market.12 American buyers are not the only ones turning to foreign
competitors. American export markets are also shrinking."3
When.consumers are asked why they prefer foreign goods over
American-made products, they consistently answer that American
products do not match the quality of their foreign competitors. The
automobile industry best exemplifies consumer dissatisfaction with
the quality of American-made products. Surveys consistently indicate
that American consumers believe Japanese cars are of superior quality in terms of assembly workmanship, reliability, and durability."
Industry data on defects in new cars indicates that, at least with respect to assembly quality, this belief may be well-founded. In a 1979
nationwide survey of new car buyers, owners of domestically built
cars reported a three to five times greater incidence of defects in the
9.

See America Loses Its Punch, INDusTRY WEEK, June 14, 1982, at 61.

10. A smokestack industry is a traditional heavy industry such as steel or automobile
manufacturing. A mature industry is one in which the basic product and production modes are
not subject to major change through technological innovation.
11. See L MAGAZINER & R. REmcH, MINDING AMERIcA'S BusINEss 169 (1982).
12.

T. PETRs & R WATTRnA'N, IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE 34 (1982).

13. America Loses Its Punch, supra note 9, at 63. American export markets such as machine tools, chemicals, and consumer durables have also been declining. Id.
14. Abernathy, Clark & Kantrow, The New Industrial Competition, HARv. Bus. REV.,
Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 68, 73.
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first month of ownership than did owners of comparable foreign-built
automobiles.1 5
Not only do consumers prefer foreign-built goods but American
manufacturers are also increasingly turning to imported products because of their superior quality. In 1981-1982, the Conference Board,
Inc. surveyed 508 American companies on the extent to which they
used foreign-made machinery in United States production.' 6 Sixtythree percent of the firms reported that they did use foreign-built
machinery. 17 Of those firms, 56 percent said that quality was the
most important reason for using foreign machinery instead of United
States machinery' s
The difference in quality between foreign and domestic products
can be dramatic. For instance, Hewlett Packard, a major computer
company, bought computer chips from both Japanese and American
sources. The firm reported that the American made chips had ten
times more defects than their Japanese equivalents. 19 Given this experience, the capture of 70 percent of the computer chip market by
Japanese firms is not surprising. *0
Existing data strongly indicates that consumer dissatisfaction
with United States products stems from their lack of quality. What is
not clear, however, is the cause of this quality gap. A number of commentators have blamed government overregulation, capital shortages,
or government deficits for the decline of many American industries. 2
However, as an increasing number of commentators have pointed
out, the Japanese and German firms which are out-competing American firms face more government regulation and invest more heavily
in environmental and safety features than their American counterparts. 2 Additionally, statistics showing that capital investment in the
United States has not been significantly smaller than foreign capital
investment undercut the "capital shortage" theory of non15. Id. at 74; see also W.

ABERNATHY,

K.

CLARK

& A.

KANTROW, INDUSTRIAL RENAISSANCE

65 (1983). Ironically, repair incidence data indicates that in terms of long-term mechanical reliability, American and Japanese products are on a par. Id. at 65-66.

16. J. BASCHE,
17.
18.

TECHNOLOGY IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

8 (1983).

Id.
Id. at 9.

19. Fallows, American Industry: What Ails It, How to Save It, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Sept. 1980, at 35, 40. American producers may be closing the quality gap in computer chips.
When the test was repeated in 1982, U.S. chips almost met the same quality standards as their
Japanese competitors. Garvin, Quality on the Line, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 65, 73.
20. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
21. See R. REICH,,THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 119-20 (1983); Fallows, supra note 19, at
41-42.
22. See Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 67, 69-70; R. RmCH, supra note 21, at 119-20; T. PETERs & R. WATTERMAN,
supra note 12, at 33; Fallows, supra note 19, at 42-44.
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competitiveness."

Several commentators, 2 rejecting the idea that either government
or a capital shortage is responsible for America's declining competitiveness, have identified flaws in management style as the source of
America's competitive problems.2 5 Some of these flaws are, admittedly, beyond the scope of antitrust laws. For instance, one of management's most pervasive problems is its inability to motivate workers or to foster a productive human relationship between the
employee and her supervisors.2 6 Antitrust laws can do little to remedy this defect. An approach to antitrust law which fosters competition on the merits could, however, help remedy management's failure
to focus on product quality.
III. COMPETMON ON THE MERITS AND PRODUCT QuALrry

Management specialists Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr., maintain that "the reason behind the absence of focus on
product or people in so many American companies... isthe simple
presence of a focus on something else."' 27 That "something else" ac-

cording to Peters and Waterman is "overreliance on analysis from
corporate ivory towers and overreliance on financial slight of hand. 28
Another reason for management's failure to concentrate on producing
quality products is its practice of competing through innovations in
marketing, finance or corporate structure rather than innovations in
employee or product development. 9 A prime example of this phenomenon is the automobile industry. A study of the automobile industry by Harvard Business School professors Abernathy, Clark and
Kantrow concludes that the primary competitive advantage of Japanese automobile producers lies "in their execution of a well-designed
strategy based on the shrewd use of manufacturing excellence." 30 In
contrast, in the American automobile industry, manufacturing excellence has not been a major competitive factor. Instead, American automobile manufacturers have tended to compete by means of styling,
23. R. REICH, supra note 21, at 120.
24. These commentators include Professor Reich, Thomas Peters, and Robert H. Watterman, Jr. See supra notes 11 & 12.
25. Pascarella, The Management of Quality and the Quality of Management, INDusTRY
WEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 44; Fallows, supra note 19, at 42-45; Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 22,

at 77; T. PETES & R. WATrERmAN, supra note 12, at 41.
26. See T. PETERS & R. WATrERm-, supranote 12, at 39; see also Pascarella, supra note
25, at 55.

27. T. PETERS & R. WATrmAN, supra note 12, at 40.
28.
29.
30.

Id.
Pascarella, supra note 25, at 47.
Abernathy, Clark & Kantrow, supra note 14, at 74.
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marketing, and dealership networks."'
The tendency to de-emphasize manufacturing excellence as a
competitive tool is not peculiar to the American automobile industry.
In summarizing how American producers could outcompete their
German rivals, Joseph A. Lamprecht and Robert Hays assert that
American management must seek a competitive advantage through
superior products.3 2 As they point out, "[a] good reputation in the
international marketplace cannot be secured through marketing flair
or quick fixes. It must be based, as always, on production of quality
goods."3 3 A policy of competition on the merits, administered
through the antitrust laws, could shift American management's attention from "quick fixes" to product quality.
Competition on the merits means that firms must compete
through the intrinsic qualities of their products rather than through
extraneous conditions such as tying an inferior product to a more desirable product, or bribing dealers to promote one product at the expense of a competitors' products. Innovation and improvement of
product quality are virtually the only methods for competing on the
merits. Thus, competition on the merits virtually subsumes the concept of producing quality goods. Antitrust laws can promote product
quality by creating incentives to compete on the merits and disincentives to compete otherwise.
Antitrust laws could create disincentives for competition which is
not on the merits by making such competition a determinative factor
in deciding whether a business practice violates antitrust laws. Conversely, antitrust laws could encourage competition on the merits by
making clear that this competition is acceptable competitive behavior. More importantly, encouraging competition on the merits
through antitrust laws would clarify society's preference that firms
compete on the merits. Accordingly, management would implement
this preference as the proper way to operate a business.3 4
31. Id.
32. Lamprecht & Hayes, Germany's World Class Manufacturers, HAiv. Bus. REV., Nov.Dec. 1982, at 137. See also Pascarella, supra note 25, at 47.
33. Lamprecht & Hayes, supra note 32, at 143. An increasing body of evidence supports
the relationship between product quality and firm profitability. A recent study of 623 businesses by Harvard and Stanford business school professors indicated that product quality was
an important factor in firm profitability. Phillips, Chang & Buzzell, ProductQuality, Cost Position and Business Performance: A Test of Some Key Hypotheses, J. OF MARKETING, Spring
1983, at 26. Interestingly enough, the authors also concluded that pursuit of quality is not necessarily inconsistent with efforts to maintain low-cost leadership. Id. at 41. See also Garvin,
supra note 19 (study of room air conditioner industry demonstrating that product quality is the
key factor in firm profitability).

34. Cf. H.

PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION

43-44 (1968) (emphasizing that

criminal sanctions play an important role in enabling persons to internalize societal values and
preferences).
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Analysis of how competition on the merits would resolve current
antitrust issues illustrates how incorporation of this doctrine into antitrust laws would improve product quality. The doctrine has wide
application to the restraints on trade proscribed by section 1 of the
Sherman Act.3 5 These include both horizontal restraints such as
group boycotts and conspiracies to-eliminate competitors through unfair methods and vertical restraints such as vertical territorial divisions, resale price maintenance, and tie-ins. The doctrine also applies
to monopolization and attempted monopolization,"6 prohibited by
37
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
IV.

HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS

A. Group Boycotts
1. The General Rule - Kors v. Broadway-Hale Stores
The subject of group boycotts is far from the clearest area of antitrust law. For one thing, the term "group boycotts" has been used to
describe practices which are really forms of price fixing among competitors.3 8 Even excluding price fixing agreements which are mislabeled as "group boycotts," courts and commentators still have great
difficulty defining a group boycott.3 9 For purposes of simplicity this
35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
36. The selection of the areas discussed does not imply that competition on the merits is
irrelevant to other disputes in the antitrust field. For example, the per se illegal practice of
horizontal market division can be viewed as a joint refusal by competitors to compete on the
merits of their products. See United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Nonetheless,
the areas selected are the ones where the concept of competition on the merits is the most
germane.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
38. L. SuLLIvAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT 256-58 (1977). Professor Sullivan
cites cases such as Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) and
United States v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930) as examples of price fixing cases
mislabeled as group boycotts.
39. For some of the more recent scholarly attempts to define what a per se illegal boycott
is see, e.g., Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COL. L. REV. 685 (1979) and McCormick, Group Boycotts-PerSe or Not Per Se, That
is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 703 (1976). Courts have also been confused as to what
conduct should constitute a per se illegal group boycott. As one trial court stated:
Despite the pronouncements of the Supreme Court, a multitude of lower courts have
continued to evaluate alleged boycotts under a "rule of reason" analysis rather than by
the per se doctrine employed by the Supreme Court.... To state that the law concerning group boycotts and Section 1 of the Sherman Act lacks consistency would be to understate the truth by a wide margin.
Callum Elec. & Mech'l, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n, 436 F. Supp. 418, 428-29 (D.S.C.
1976), aff'd, 569 F.2d 821 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
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article will adopt Professor Lawrence Sullivan's definition of a group
boycott. Under this definition, group boycotts are "efforts by traders
at one level to keep out others or inhibit their competitive efforts at
that level by making it more difficult for them to find what traders at
that level need, usually suppliers or customers but sometimes access
to transactions with other traders at the same level."'40
A simple hypothetical will illustrate the utility and applicability
of the concept of competition on the merits to group boycotts so
defined. 4 '
XYZ, Inc., is one of a dozen manufacturers of marine pumps.
It is a large firm which makes numerous types of electrical
equipment. Recently the firm has lost a number of small but
lucrative contracts to QLM, Inc., a small manufacturer of
marine pumps. QLM's pumps actually cost somewhat more
than XYZ's pumps. However, due to harmonious labor/management relations and its system of manufacturing, QLM's
pumps have fewer defects than XYZ's pumps.
Recently the firm Control, Inc., has developed a new type
of governor for marine pumps which allows the pumps to
function more quickly and efficiently. Control has been selling
the governors to all makers of marine pumps. The management of XYZ sees an opportunity to put the pesky QLM company "in its place." XYZ management approaches Control
and urges it to stop selling the new governor units to QLM.
The management of Control expresses its unwillingness to do
so, pointing out that QLM has been a good customer. The
management of XYZ points out to Control that while XYZ
will continue to purchase governor units from Control, XYZ's
many other divisions might be forced to consider shifting
their purchases of Control's other products to Control's
competitors.
Control's management reluctantly decides to discontinue
selling its governors to QLM. QLM is not driven from the
marine pump business, but it does lose a number of the lucrative contracts it had previously been winning. XYZ, Inc. has
acquired the majority of these contracts. QLM, Inc. is still in
business, but has been forced to lower its prices because it
lacks the new governor units for its pumps. Total output in
the industry remains the same and the price of pumps (with
the exception of QLM's) remains the same.
40.

L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 232.
41. The problem is truly a hypothetical one. Any resemblance to an actual case is purely
coincidental.
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Whether XYZ and Control's actions should be judged under a per
se standard or under a rule of reason standard is open to question.
Under a per se rule, certain activities are, by definition, illegal under
antitrust laws. Under a rule of reason, a defendant's actions must on
balance injure competition to be illegal.4 " Looking at the Supreme
Court's decision in Kors v. Broadway-Hale Stores,43 XYZ's actions
would seem to be a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Kors involved a claim by a small retailer that a large competitor had
convinced appliance manufacturers to stop selling to Klors or to sell
to him only at disadvantageous terms. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that hundreds
of other appliance dealers could still compete with Broadway-Hale
Stores." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts stated

in Klors' complaint, if proven, constituted a group boycott, which is
per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.45
Application of Kors to the hypothetical would result in a finding
of liability on the part of XYZ. A number of lower courts, as well as
the Chicago School of antitrust economics, 46 have, however, challenged the continued vitality of Klors.47 One of the leading members
of the Chicago School, Richard A. Posner, is now a judge on the
United States Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In dictum in two
recent decisions, Judge Posner opined that the interpretation of the
Sherman Act presented in Kors is both outdated and invalid.48 In
42. Judge Richard A. Posner has described the role of per se and Rule of Reason analysis
as follows:
The great watershed of [antitrust] law is the distinction between per se illegality and
illegality under the Rule of Reason. If a practice is within the per se category, all you
have to prove to establish a violation is that the defendant engaged in the practice; you
do not have to show that in fact the practice has had or will have an adverse effect on
competition. But if a practice is not within the per se category-if it is governed, in other
words, by the Rule of Reason (the dichotomy is not perfect, as there are some practices,
mergers for example, that are governed by another standard altogether. . . .)-then the
plaintiff must, to prevail, show not only that the defendant engaged in the practice but
also that by doing so the defendant was injuring competition.
Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 692 F.2d 1083, 1093 (1983), vacated and
reh'g en banc, 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and reh'g en banc, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th
Cir.), cert. granted, U.S. (1984).
43. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
44. Id. at 209-10.
45. Id. at 211-12.
46. The Chicago School of antitrust analysis emphasizes allocative efficiency as the sole
goal of antitrust law. The standard of allocative efficiency is derived from models developed in
neo-classical price theory. See Gerhart, supra note 2, at 320-22. See also Sullivan, Economics
and More HumanisticDisciplines: What are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA.

L. REV. 1214, 1218 (1977).
47. See R BORK, supra note 1, at 331-32.
48. See Products Liab. Ins. Agency v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 660, 665 (7th Cir.
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Products Liability Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Foster Insurance Co.49 and Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons5° Judge Posner asserted that unless a refusal to deal reduces
competition, it is not illegal under the Sherman Act.51 Elimination of
a competitor does not necessarily constitute a reduction of competition. Under Judge Posner's view competition is threatened only when
a business practice reduces output, raises prices, or drops the number
of competitors below "the number required to assure [the consumer]
being able to buy at the competitive price." 52 If one of these market
effects does not occur, the group boycott is merely a "private squabble" in which an injured plaintiff must look to state law for a
remedy.53
The Ninth Circuit has incorporated Judge Posner's views, although without citation to the preceding cases, into the holding of its
recent decision in Cascade Cabinet, Co. v. Western Cabinet &
Millwork, Inc.54 In Cascade Cabinet, the plaintiff, Cascade, claimed
that a competitor had pressured its lessee into refusing to sublease a
plant to Cascade. Cascade claimed it had incurred $500,000 in damages when it had to seek alternate sites to fulfill its contractual
obligations. 55
Finding no allegation of injury to competition, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants. 56 In doing
so, the court virtually equated injury to competition with decreased
output. The court noted that the lack of any redeeming competitive
virtues did not matter in light of the plaintiff's failure to prove an
57
injury to competition.
Under Judge Posner's and the Ninth Circuit's view, XYZ's actions
in pressuring Control, Inc., to stop selling to QLM would not result in
any injury to competition. In the hypothetical, neither the price nor
output would be affected. Even the number of competitors would remain unchanged. Thus, contrary to the finding of liability under
Klors, Judge Posner and the Ninth Circuit would likely find no anti1982).
49. Id.
50. 706 F.2d 1488 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated and reh'g en banc, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, -

U.S.

-

(1984).

51. Products Liab. Ins. Agency, 682 F.2d at 663.
52. Marrese, 706 F.2d at 1497; contra Malley-Duff & Assoc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734
F.2d 133, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1984); Corn-Tel v. Dukane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 414 (6th Cir. 1982).
53. Products Liab. Ins. Agency, 682 F.2d at 665.
54. 710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983).
55. Id. at 1369.
56. Id. at 1372-73.
57. Id. at 1373. Contra Malley-Duff & Assoc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 140-41
(3d Cir. 1984); Corn-Tel v. Dukane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982).
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trust violations by XYZ.
In addition to using Judge Posner's and the Ninth Circuit's theories, opponents of antitrust liability for XYZ might also try to use the
line of cases beginning with Oreck, Corp. v. Whirlpool, Co." These
cases hold that to be per se illegal a group boycott requires hQrizontal
commonality, that is, two or more defendants acting on the same distributional level. 9 Thus, applying the Oreck line of cases, XYZ would
not be per se liable because no horizontal commonality exists. How60
ever, liability under a rule of reason analysis is a possibility.
Proponents of XYZ's liability might counter Judge Posner's, the
Ninth Circuit's, and the Oreck's line of reasoning by citing Circuit
Court of Appeals cases typified by Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet
Corp.," and Roesch, Inc. v. Star Cooler Corp.6 2 In Roesch, for example, the Eighth Circuit held that "a per se violation [of section one of
the Sherman Act] would be established by proof that [the manufacturer] terminated its relationship with [the distributor] at the request of another competing [distributor or] distributors and that the
termination was in pursuit of a price related end. '63 The usefulness
of these cases to QLM depends upon how broadly a court would define the term "price-related end." Arguably, QLM was not in price
competition with XYZ because QLM pumps were priced higher than
XYZ pumps. Alternatively, however, the defect-free QLM pumps
may have been a better overall value, even though more costly, than
XYZ pumps. By restricting QLM's ability to make the most modern
pumps, XYZ may have been trying to reduce or eliminate price
58. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), reh'g denied, 439
U.S. 1104 (1979).
59. Among the other cases which have followed the Oreck view are Dunn & Mavis, Inc. v.
Nu-Car Driveaway, Inc., 691 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1982); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); H. & B. Equip. Co. v. International Harvester
Co., 577 F.2d 239 (5th Cir. 1978).
60. The probability that XYZ will be liable under a Rule of Reason analysis is slim. First,
any Rule of Reason analysis tends to favor defendants. As Professor (now Judge) Posner wrote
"The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice, it is little more than a
euphemism for nonliability." Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 14 (1977). Second, under the facts stated,
XYZ chan prove no direct impact on price or output. Under both Judge Posner's and the Ninth
Circuit's view, such an effect is a prerequisite to any antitrust liability under a Rule of Reason
analysis. See supra notes 48-57 and accompanying text. For an example of one of the rare cases
where a plaintiff won a group boycott case on the basis of a Rule of Reason analysis, see Smith
v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (invalidating the National Football League
draft).
61. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
62. 712 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1707 (1984).
63. See also Battle v. Watson, 712 F.2d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (McMillan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Roesch, Inc.).
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competition. 4
Although how a court would rule on an antitrust claim against
XYZ is unclear, the policy of promoting competition on the merits
dictates that a court should find XYZ per se liable for violating section 1 of the Sherman Act. Contrary to Judge Posner's and the Ninth
Circuit's view, allowing XYZ's actions to go unpunished would ultimately harm both consumers and the economy. Management would
learn that successful competition for product contracts depends not
on product quality but on questionable practices, such as cutting
competitors off from key suppliers. Firms, lulled by their "success,"
would abandon product quality as a means of competition. When
faced with a quality-conscious foreign competitor who is beyond the
reach of the tactics employed against QLM, the management of XYZ
would be unable to compete. The consumer is injured not only because she has been deprived of up-to-date QLM pumps, but also because she has been deprived of the quality pumps XYZ could have
produced (perhaps even at a lower price than QLM pumps thanks to
economies of scale) had it reformed its manufacturing operations.
Therefore, a presumption should exist under antitrust laws that a
group boycott as defined by Professor Sullivan is a per se violation of
those laws. The term presumption implies, however, that under limited circumstances a group boycott could both promote competition
on the merits and pass muster under the antitrust laws."
2. Group Boycotts which Promote Competition on the Merits
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Klors that group
boycotts are per se illegal, 6 certain group boycotts have traditionally
received a rule of reason analysis. One such type of group boycott is
the self-regulatory boycott in which an industry attempts to promote
public health or safety through industry-wide joint action. 7 Courts
are correct in not treating these boycotts as per se illegal because
they may actually promote competition on the merits and product
improvement.
An excellent example of how self-regulatory boycotts may foster
competition on the merits is Deesen v. ProfessionalGolfer's Association."' The Professional Golfers' Association ("PGA"), a membership
64. Cf. W. SLAWSON, THE NEW INFLATION 48 (1981) (noting that variations in product
quality are the economic equivalent of variations in the product's price).
65. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
67. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 247-53 (concerning industry self-regulation which tends to have the effect of a boycott).
68. 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966), reh'g denied, 385 U.S. 1032
(1967).
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organization made up of professional golfers, sponsors or cosponsors
substantially all of the men's professional golf tournaments in the
United States. 9 Deesen challenged a PGA qualifying rule which required a tournament entrant to be a club professional or to demonstrate to PGA local, tournament, and executive committees "the ability to play golf and finish in the money in tournaments in which he
competes. '7 0 The PGA terminated Deesen's status as a tournament
player because he no longer satisfied these requirements.7 1 This decision was, in a sense, a "group boycott" because concerted action by a
group of Deesen's "competitors" prevented him from competing.
Deesen could argue that his termination failed to promote competition on the merits because his competitors chose to best him not by
competing on the golf links, but by excluding him from tournaments.
However, as the Ninth Circuit recognized, the product offered to the
public by the PGA is not merely an individual performance but a golf
tournament.7 2 Ensuring that the tournaments are "not bogged down
with players of inferior ability" is necessary to present a sports product which can compete on its merits (i.e. ability to hold the interest
of sports fans) with other professional sports, such as basketball,
football and baseball games.73 Sports fans are unlikely to pay money
to watch what they accurately perceive as an inferior product.
Deesen illustrates a case where competition on the merits and
product quality were furthered by a practice which could be characterized as a group boycott. Yet, questions remain as to how receptive
antitrust courts should be to claims that group boycotts are procompetitive. In his book, The Antitrust Paradox, Judge Bork suggests
that courts should be much more willing to accept defendants' claims
of efficiency as justifying group boycotts.7 4 On the contrary, however,
courts should sustain these claims only where the defendant can
show the boycott contributes to product quality.75 Claims of other
efficiencies such as distributional efficiencies, should not be given any
weight. 6 Moreover, to defeat spurious claims of efficiency which are
based on speculative models, defendants should be required to pre69. Id. at 166.
70, Id. at 167.
71. Id. at 168.
72. Id. at 170.
73. Professor (now Judge) Bork cites several other examples of group boycotts which
might be quality promoting such as an agreement by professional basketball team owners to
refuse to hire a player suspended for gambling (citing Molinas v. National Basketball Ass'n, 190
F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)) or an agreement by screw manufacturers to standardize sizes. R
BORK, supra note 1, at 332-33.
74. R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 333.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
76. See infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
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sent an empirical demonstration of actual product quality
improvement.
United States v. Nationwide Trailer Rental Systems, Inc.
(NTRS) 77 provides a nearly perfect example of a spurious or speculative claim of efficiency. The NTRS was a membership organization of
trailer rental companies engaged in "one-way rentals. 1 87 It allowed
members to rent trailers bound for any other city where a fellow
NTRS member was located. The organization's rules forbade granting membership to any firm in the "same city or immediate vicinity"
as an existing NTRS member. 7 e The district court held that, as a
territorial division, the provision was a per se violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act.8 0
Judge Bork cites Nationwide as an example of the courts' misguided unwillingness to recognize efficiency justifications for group
boycott," and criticizes the courts for ignoring the efficiencies promoted by the NTRS membership rule. Specifically, Bork points to
the statement in NTRS's Supreme Court brief that "when persons
. . . build up by advertising and sales effort. . . a valuable organization [which] must share property with every newcomer who applies,
it must be obvious that there will be no incentive for further membership or investment in such an organization." 2 What was so obvious to NTRS's lawyers and Judge Bork was not so obvious to real
world market participants. In spite of the ban on exclusive territories
in NTRS, independent businesspersons were still eager to join and
invest in burgeoning trailer-truck rental franchise systems such as
83
"U-Haul," "Ryder" and "Jartran."
77. 156 F. Supp 800 (D. Kan.), aff'd, 355 U.S. 10 (1957).
78. Id. at 801.
79. Id. at 802.
80. Id. at 805. As noted in the text, the district court found the provision to be a per se
illegal horizontal market division agreement rather than a group boycott. The district court did
find a provision giving the Board of Directors of the N.T.R.S. the right to expel members a per
se illegal group boycott. Id. at 805-06.
81. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 333. Bork categorized N.T.R.S.'s one member to a territory
rule as a group boycott. This categorization may be correct because the rule was an agreement
not to deal (i.e. exchange trailers) with traders (i.e. rental outlets) operating on the same level.
The possibility of characterizing the same practices as either group boycotts or as horizontal

territorial divisions is not uncommon. Cf. W.

HOLMES,

1983-84

ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK

33

(1983) (pointing out that the decision in Rowe Furniture Corp. v. Serta, Inc., 1982-83 Trade
Cas. (CCH)
64,993 (N.D. Ill. 1982), while couched in terms of a group boycott, could with
equal facility have been decided as a horizontal market allocation case).
82. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 333 (emphasis supplied).
83. By 1973 over 16,000 independent dealers and franchisees had joined the U-Haul system while another 8,000 were associated with other franchise systems. Telephone Interview
with Mr. Paul Kelly, Director of Public Relations, U-Haul Corp. (Dec. 12, 1983). The number
has declined since 1975 for reasons unrelated to the inability to maintain exclusive territories.
Id.
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Before accepting group boycotts as procompetitive, courts should
also require defendants to demonstrate that no less restrictive alter84
native methods of improving or protecting product quality exists.
For example, assume that several firms enter into a joint venture to
develop a new industrial process. None of the firms have the resources to develop the process independently. The firms execute an
ancillary agreement not to license the new process to any competitor
of any member of the venture. The firms claim this restriction is necessary to entice firms to participate in the joint venture. On the surface the arrangement is a candidate for rule of reason scrutiny because the development of the new industrial process is competition
on the merits through a focus on product quality. However, to avoid
per se treatment, the joint ventures should show why other alternatives will not protect the members' incentive to join the venture.8 5
Thus, the competition on the merits model would require at least
strict scrutiny of group boycotts. Although some may be procompetitive, group boycotts generally promote noncompetitive methods of
84. Most courts have been unwilling to require defendants in Rule of Reason cases to
prove that their challenged practices were the least anticompetitive alternatives available to the
firms. Instead, most courts require only that the challenged practice be reasonably necessary to
effectuate pro-competitive business objectives. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., 552 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). A number of lower courts
have stated that defendants in antitrust cases must prove they are utilizing the least restrictive
(anticompetitive) alternative. See, e.g., Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 506 F.2d 934,
945 (5th Cir. 1975); Seigel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972). These cases have been distinguished on the grounds that they involved per
se violations of the antitrust laws. See American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inn, Inc., 521 F.2d
1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975). This distinction may seem somewhat odd given that a true per se
analysis permits no justification for a forbidden practice. See In re Yarn Processing Patent
Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127, 1134 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Lex Tex., Ltd. v.
Universal Textured Yarns, Inc., 433 U.S. 910 (1977). In fact, the distinction makes some sense
given the issues addressed in Copper Liquor and Siegel. CopperLiquor involved vertical territorial restraints. It was decided in the period between the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (declaring vertical territorial restraints to
be per se illegal) and its decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (declaring that such restrictions were to receive Rule of Reason treatment). During the
interval between the two cases lower federal courts began to carve out a number of exceptions
to the application of a per se rule to vertical territorial restraints. See, e.g., Tripoli Co. v. Wella
Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970) (developing health and safety
exception to per se rule against vertical territorial restraints). The Copper Liquor court used a
least restrictive alternative analysis to justify its refusal to apply the justification developed in
Tripoli Co. to the practices of defendant Coors. Copper Liquor, 506 F.2d at 945.
The Ninth Circuit in Siegel was faced with a tying case. Tie-ins have always been an unusual type of per se violation because recognized defenses exist. See infra notes 156-60 and
accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit used a least restrictive alternative analysis to determine
if one of those defenses, preservation of goodwill, had been established by the defendant.
Siegel, 448 F.2d at 51.
85. One alternative might be to require new licensees to compensate the original venturers for the initial risks in developing the process as well as providing an ordinary license fee.
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corporate growth. Judicial validation of group boycotts will only encourage businesses to use competitive methods which ignore product
quality and competition on the merits.
B. Conspiracy to Eliminate a Competitor Through Trade
Practices-ThePick-Barth Doctrine
A candidate for revival under a renewed emphasis on competition
on the merits is the Pick-Barth doctrine. Under the doctrine, which
was developed by the First Circuit, a conspiracy to eliminate or perhaps even injure a business rival through unfair competition is a per
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.86 The Pick-Barth doctrine has been something of an orphan in antitrust law. The court of
appeals which developed the doctrine has limited its scope substantially.17 Other circuits have explicitly rejected the doctrine8s and commentators have heavily criticized it.89
The value of improving product quality through competition on
the merits suggests that the critics of the Pick-Barth doctrine have
been too hasty in rejecting it. The harm engendered by Pick-Barth
conspiracies is quite similar to the harm caused by group boycotts.
The conspirator who successfully injures or eliminates a competitor
through unfair methods of competition learns that "dirty tricks" and
not better quality products will provide competitive victory.9 0 When
a competitor is faced with quality-conscious foreign competition beyond the reach of such tactics, he will be unable to compete effectively." By making conspiracies to eliminate competitors through unfair methods of competition per se violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the government can encourage firms to compete
against their rivals on the basis of product quality rather than questionable trade practices.
The importance of the Pick-Barth doctrine in promoting competi86. Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 102 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932).
87. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547
(1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
88. See, e.g., University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983);
Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus. Inc., 576 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
89. See, e.g., Yeorg, Should a Trade Secret'sMisappropriationClaim Lie in the Procrustean Antitrust Bed?, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1977); Note, Antitrust Treatment of Competitive
Torts: An Argument for a Rule of Per Se Legality Under the Sherman Act, 58 TEx L. Rzv. 415
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Per Se Legality]. But see P. MARcUS, ANTITRUST LAW &
PRACTICE, § 135 (1980); Note, The Pick-Barth Doctrine: Should Unfair Competition Belong
Under the Sherman Act?, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 253 (1979).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 64-66.
91. Id.
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tion on the merits does not mean the doctrine must remain in its
present form. The Pick-Barthdoctrine relies on state unfair competition law for its basic scope. This dependence on state law might rule
out tactics which are arguably competition on the merits. For example, inducing a breach of an employment contract is universally considered a form of unfair competition under state law.9 2 A firm seeking
to obtain needed expertise by offering employees of rivals superior
wages and working conditions may, however, be competing on the
merits for the services of the employees. At the very least, the firm
may be taking action necessary to engage in competition on the
merits.9
The arguably overbroad scope of the Pick-Barth doctrine could be
remedied by requiring a plaintiff in a Pick-Barth conspiracy action to
prove that the defendant's actions not only violated applicable state
unfair trade practices law, but that they also constituted competition
not on the merits. Courts will have to engage in some difficult line
drawing under this proposed revision of Pick-Barth. The effort
would, however, be worth the cost because the doctrine could be a
strong incentive for refocusing firms' attention on producing quality
products.
V. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS

94

A. Vertical TerritorialRestraints and Resale Price Maintenance
Under present antitrust law, vertical territorial restraints are
given rule of reason treatment.9 5 In practice, this means defendants
are overwhelming favorites to prevail if a vertical territorial restraint
is alleged.9 6 In contrast, vertical price restraints remain per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.97 A number of commentators
have criticized the differentiation between vertical price and territorial restraints. 8 These commentators maintain that both types of re92. See 2 R CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, §§ 9.04-05
(Altman rev. 1982).
93. Note, Per Se Legality, supra note 89, at 427-88.
94. A vertical restraint is one imposed between firms on different market levels, e.g., between a manufacturer and a retailer of its products. ABA ANTITRusT SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEvELOPMENTs 55 (2d ed. 1984). In general, vertical restraints have received more tolerant
treatment from antitrust courts than horizontal restraints (restraints imposed by competitors).
P. MARCUS, supra note 89, § 161.
95. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
96. See Posner, supra note 60, at 14.
97. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1237 (7th Cir. 1982),

aff'd, 104 S.Ct. 1464, reh'g denied, 104 S.Ct. 2378 (1984).
98. 1R BORK, supra note 1, at 291-98; Posner, supra note 60, at 8.ContraBarrett, Restrictive Distributionand the Assault of the "FreeRiders", 7 J. Cop. LAw 467, 469 (1982) (advo-
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straints should receive rule of reason treatment. 9 Judge Posner has
gone even farther. He maintains that both practices should be per se
legal. 1°0 If, however, American industry is to regain its competitive
position through a focus on product quality, then courts should be
skeptical of the claims of efficiency used to justify both vertical territorial and price restraints.
Vertical restraints, unlike classic group boycotts, are not necessarily aimed at a competitor. Thus, product improvement and vertical restraints are not always inconsistent. Levi Strauss, Inc. exemplifies a corporation which at least for a time successfully combined an
emphasis on quality and competition through distribution restrictions. Levi Strauss historically maintained high quality standards in
its products. 10 1 However, for many years Levi Strauss also maintained a system of resale price maintenance which was only ended by
a consent decree with the Federal Trade Commission. 0 2 Despite
Levi's success with vertical restraints, for most companies these restraints can be diversionary. The American auto industry's competition through dealership networks, rather than innovation and product quality, illustrates this point. 0 3- Another example is the decline of
04
the American color television industry.1
The major conflict between competition on the merits and vertical
restraints is the inconsistency between the concept of competition on
the merits and claims of "efficiencies" used to justify vertical restraints. Those who favor rule of reason treatment or even per se legality for vertical territorial and price restraints basically make the
same argument. They begin with a syllogistic premise. A firm which
imposes vertical price or territorial restraints cannot rationally hope
to extract increased profits from the restraint via the suppression of
cating continued per se treatment to resale price maintenance); Gerhart, The "Competitive
Advantage" Explanationfor IntrabandRestraints:An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417,
436 (also advocating continued per se treatment of resale price maintenance).
99. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 291-98; Posner, supra note 60, at 8.
100. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per
Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981).
101. T. PETERS & R. WATMRMAN, supra note 12, at 190.
102. Levi Strauss & Co., [1976-79 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,400
(July 12, 1978) (consent order to cease and desist). The management of Levi Strauss has indicated that the termination of its system of resale price maintenance has proven beneficial for
the company. See Special Report-Intellectual, PoliticalDebates Start on Policy for Resale
Price Maintenance, [Jan.-June] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1105, at 557, 561
(Mar. 10, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Special Report]. Indeed, a vice-president of Levi Strauss
indicated that the only question in his mind is whether the restraints should not have been
removed sooner. Id.
103. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
104. See infra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
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intrabrand competition. 0 5 The only business which can profit from
theirestraints is the retailer which distributes the firm's products.
The manufacturing firm is not an eleemosynary institution created to
confer increased profits on its distributing retailers. Thus, the only
explanation for the imposition of the restraints must be that they are
the most efficient way of effecting distribution of the manufacturer's
product. 106 Proponents of vertical restraints then point to various
specific efficiencies which they claim are engendered by the restraints. For devotees of the concept that the sole goal of the antitrust laws is increasing "allocative efficiency," the existence of such
efficiencies would probably be sufficient justification for the
restraints. 07
Despite arguments that increased efficiencies justify vertical restraints, courts have generally required restraints to be pro-competitive before they can pass a rule of reason analysis. 108 Therefore,
courts favoring vertical restraints argue that the efficiencies created
through the vertical restraints can assist the firm imposing them in
becoming a stronger interbrand competitor. 109 Thus, all ill effects on
intrabrand competition which are engendered by the restraints may
be offset by benefits to interbrand competition.
A focus on product quality and the analysis underlying it tend to
undermine both the basic premise of the case for vertical restraints
and the specific claims of efficiencies made on behalf of vertical restraints. The actual competitive performance of American management undermines assertions that firms impose vertical restraints because they are more efficient. American management has been widely
criticized for being too concerned with short-run profits rather than
long-term efficiency, and being unwilling to take actions which will
not increase "bottom line" profits in the next fiscal year." 0 Firms
may impose vertical restraints not because they are an efficient longrun method of doing business, but because they will promote management's interest by maximizing short-run profits.""'
105.

See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 290.

106. Id.
107. Id. at ch. 4-6; Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 1, 14-17 (1982).
108. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'r v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
109. See, e.g., Graphic Prods. Distrib., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1571-73 (11th
Cir. 1983); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1005-06 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981); Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp.; 483 F.
Supp. 750, 760-61 (D. Md. 1980), aff'd, 638 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981).
110. Hayes & Abernathy, supra note 22, at 68, 70; Fallows, supra note 19, at 44-45.
Bowen, How to Regain Our Competitive Edge, FORTUNE, Mar. 9, 1981 at 74, 84.
111. The concept that a firm and its management's interests may not coincide is not new.
Ongoing debate has existed over the extent to which management's independent goals lead

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

Vertical restraints may increase short-run profits in a number of
ways. First, vertical price restraints can blunt dealer pressure on
manufacturers to lower the manufacturer's margin of profit on sales
to its dealers. 11 2 Second, vertical territorial restraints can prevent the
growth of dealers with sufficient volume to have significant bargaining power vis-d-vis the manufacturer. 11 3 Third, vertical territorial restraints can be an incentive to induce dealers to promote a manufacturer's brand in preference to brands without such restraints." 4
Despite their short term advantages, the claims used to justify vertical restraints are inconsistent with competition on the merits. The
primary claim of efficiency made on behalf of vertical restraints is
that they optimize local sales efforts by eliminating free riders, and
by supplying dealers with increased profits to fund those efforts." 5
The prevalence of free riders in the real world of retailing is questionable." 6 The extent to which dealers will invest extra profits from
vertical restraints in local sales efforts is also questionable."1 7 Even if
these assumptions are accurate, courts should scrutinize the local
sales efforts supposedly encouraged by vertical price and territorial
restraints to ensure they are actually competition on the merits and
not the nonproduct focused competition so deleterious to American
industry.
firms to act other than as rational profit-maximizers. For an excellent summary of the debate
and the voluminous materials generated by that controversy, see F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 29-41 (2d ed. 1980). The assertion that American
management is short-sighted, however, places the debate in an entirely different light. If the
criticisms are correct, then there is no longer a clear-cut, two-sided debate (i.e. profit maximization versus other independent goals of management). Instead, a third possibility exists-that
American managers are short-run profit maximizers.
Evidence that American management principally seeks short-run profit casts doubt on the
utility of microeconomic analysis in antitrust law. One of the basic assumptions of
microeconomic analysis, as applied to antitrust law, is that firms will act as rational profit maximizers. See D. GIFFORD & L. RASKIND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 7
(1983). Firms may not act as predicted in microeconomic models, not because management is
pursuing goals other than profit maximization, but because it is pursuing short-run profit maximization rather than long-run strategies.
112. See Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No Frills Case for a Per Se Rule
Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1492 (1983); Gerhart, supra 98, at 426-29;
Barrett, supra 98, at 472-73.
113. See Burns, The Anti-trust Laws and the Regulation of Price Competition, 4 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROas.

301, 307 (1937).

114. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 19 (1978); Barrett, supra note 98, at 473.
115. Liebeler, supra note 107, at 1 n.4; R. BORK, supra note 1, at 290, 430-32.
116. See Stewart & Roberts, Viability of the Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rule: Schwinn
Down, How Many to Go?, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 727, 753 (1980); Special Report, supra note 102, at
560.
117. See Pitofsky, supra note 112, at 1493; Barrett, supra note 98, at 475; see also Stewart & Roberts, supra note 116, at 754 (stating that "human nature reveals that the distributor
will attempt to retain as much of the monopoly profit as possible.").
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Vertical restraints supposedly encourage point of sales services
such as post-sales customer service, including warranty service,
presale customer familiarization, and presale local advertising.11
Competing through post-sale customer aid and assistance is competition on the merits. As commentators point out, these services are an
inseparable and necessary part of product quality. 119 Thus, if vertical
territorial or price restraints encourage the provision of these services, they are encouraging competition on the merits. Justifying vertical restraints on this basis, however, is problematic because they are
not actually needed to encourage post-sale customer service. The
consumer receives the post-sale services only if he buys the product.
Therefore, another dealer cannot free ride.2
Whether presales service constitutes competition on the merits is
also problematic. Certain presale services such as demonstrating to a
customer how a sale item works, or conveying accurate product information to customers is competition on the merits or, at the very
least, necessary for this type of competition. In contrast, point of
sales advertising can also be precisely the type of addictive substitute
for product quality which has proven so fatally attractive to American industry. Manufacturers may be attempting to sell their products
not by making them better, but by inducing dealers through higher
profit margins to "push" them in preference to competitor's products
or by creating an "image" of quality.121 Commentators have criticized
these tactics for two reasons. First, they create false product differentiation which allows manufacturers to reap quasi-monopoly profits.
Second, they lead to the dissemination of false or misleading information to consumers. 2 2 Despite the Supreme Court's cavalier dismissal of the first problem in Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., it and the consumer information argument remain as
23
counterweights to the alleged efficiencies of vertical restraints.
The concept of competition on the merits adds a third counterweight. Many of the so-called efficiencies associated with vertical restraints are nothing more than the "quick fix" business tactics which
have been so ineffectual in the face of foreign competition based
118. See SEc. ANTrrRUST L., A.BA, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERncAL ISTRICTIONs

LIMITING

CoMpsrrroN, 68 (1977); Carr, Some Reflections on Vertical Restraints, 13 U. ToL.
L. REv. 587, 589 (1982).
119. Takeuchi & Quelch, Quality Is More Than Making a Good Product, HARv. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1983, at 139.
120. See Barrett, supra note 98, at 475.
121. See W. SLAWSON, supra note 65, at 37.
122. See F. ScHERER, supra note 111, at 380-84; see also Comanor, Vertical Territorial
and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1422-27
(1968) (examining the anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints).
123. 433 U.S. 36, 56 n.25 (1977).
INTRBRAND
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upon product quality. As discussed previously, these practices not
only cost consumers money, but they may, in the long-run be harmful
to both the firms using them and to the American economy. The declining competitive position of the American color television industry
both exemplifies the inefficiency of distributional restraints and is a
particularly ironic example in light of the Supreme Court's endorsement of the industry's vertical territorial restraints in Sylvania.
American firms pioneered and dominated the color television
market until the 1970's.124 In the 1960's, American color television
manufacturers began to encounter significant Japanese competition.
American and Japanese manufacturers adopted very different competitive strategies. The American manufacturers had a three pronged
strategy: (a) heavy reliance on media advertising to create a "brand
image"; 125 (b) utilization of a network of small independent dealers,
often coupled with distributional restraints;1 2 6 and (c) emphasis on
pushing the consumer toward the higher priced top of the line models. 127 The last two techniques may have been related. Intensive sales
effort is necessary to push consumers to buy a higher priced product
than they initially desire. Small independent dealers, encouraged by
supra-competitive profits created by distributional restraints, were in
a position to provide the needed sales effort. Mass marketing "discount houses" may have been unwilling or unable to provide the requisite salesmanship.
The Japanese color television firms adopted a quite different
strategy both in terms of manufacturing and distribution. First, the
Japanese adhered to a policy of creating a cost advantage through
manufacturing excellence and then passing this cost advantage on to
distributing retailers and consumers. 128 Second, the Japanese emphasized the reliability of their color television sets. For example, Japanese sets in the first month after purchase on the average required
only half the service calls of their American equivalents. 2 9 Lastly,
the Japanese utilized the most reliable and cost efficient, although
not necessarily the most innovative, existing technology. For example, Japanese manufacturers built all solid-state color television sets
30
several years before their American competitors.
124. See I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 11, at 169.
125. Id. at 177-78.
126. Id.
127. See Millstein, Decline in an Expanding Industry: Japanese Competition in Color
Television, in AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 106, 119 (J. Zysman & L.
Tyson eds. 1983).
128. See I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 11, at 172-75.
129. Id. at 175-77.
130. See Millstein, supra note 127, at 118. For other ways in which Japanese color televi-
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The Japanese distribution strategy consisted of two prongs. The
first prong was the introduction of quality built sets at the low end of
the market.1 31 The second prong was the utilization of discount
chains as marketing outlets. 13 2 The Japanese relied largely on product quality while their American competitors, apparently mesmerized
by their traditional advertising and restricted distribution strategies,
did not compete on the merits of their televisions. The result was a
disaster for the American firms. In the thirteen years between 1964
and 1977, American firms lost thirty-seven percent of the domestic
color television market to Japanese competitors. 133 The losses would
have continued at an even more alarming rate had not the Japanese
firms "voluntarily" agreed to restrict their exports for three years
through an "orderly marketing agreement."1 34
In theory, the efficiencies garnered through the American manufacturers' restricted distribution system should have enabled them to
compete successfully against their Japanese counterparts. Instead,
the Japanese routed their American competitors. Not only did the
alleged efficiencies of a restricted distribution system prove to be illusory, but the system actually aided Japanese manufacturers in their
attempt to penetrate the American color television market by opening up the "low end" of the market to Japanese penetration.
Application of the concept of competition on the merits to vertical
price and territorial restraints indicates that while these restraints
can enhance product quality, they can also lead to the use of destructive competitive methods. The former effects are perhaps enough to
justify giving vertical price and territorial restraints rule of reason
treatment. The latter effects should, however, cause courts to view
such restraints skeptically. Rather than relying on generalized claims
of efficiencies courts should require defendants to demonstrate specifically how restraints would lead to improved product quality.13 5
sion manufacturers utilized more reliable and cost-efficient technology to best their American
competitors, see L MAGAZINER & R REICH, supra note 11, at 172-75.
131. See Millstein, supra note 127, at 119-20.
132. See I. MAGAZINER & R. REICH, supra note 11, at 177-78. The Sony Corporation was
an exception to this rule. Id.
133. Id. at 169.
134. Id.; see also Milistein, supra note 127, at 137-41.
135. Unfortunately, careful analysis of vertical restraints by antitrust courts is in short
supply. One commentator described the situation as follows:
In cases where a market-power analysis has not been deemed sufficient to support a*
judgment for the defendant, the courts have reviewed the asserted basis for the restraints. These analyses have not been particularly enlightening, but have followed the
lead of the Supreme Court in Sylvania in merely listing some reasons and making some
assumptions as to why a particular restraint might be reasonable.
Rill, Non-Price Vertical RestraintsSince Sylvania:Market Conditions and Dual Distribution,
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B. Vertical Restraints- Tie-Ins
A tie in is the conditioning of the sale or lease of one product on
the sale or lease of a second product. 36 The Warren Court developed
the concept of competition on the merits in the tie-in area, and most
modern antitrust courts pay at least lip service to the concept in the
area of tie-ins. 3 7 Under certain circumstances, a tie-in is a per se, or
more accurately a quasi per se, violation of the antitrust laws. 138
Courts and commentators have pointed to a number of anticompetitive effects of tie-ins which they believe justify per se treatment of
tie-ins. These effects include the possibility of extending monopoly or
market power into other markets, also known as leveraging, 139 fore-

closing competitors in the tied product from making sales to those
purchasers forced to accept the tie,' 40 discriminating in price between
142
certain buyers,' 4 ' and interfering with consumers' free choice.

In justifying the per se status of tie-ins, the Supreme Court has
also noted the inconsistency between competition on the merits and
tie-ins. 43 The Court has not precisely defined competition on the
merits. However, the conflict between tie-ins and the perception of
competition on the merits as a means of encouraging competition
based on product quality is clear. First, a tie-in may itself be a means
52

ANTITRUST

L.J. 95, 101 (1983).

Two cases exist in which antitrust courts actually examined the pro-competitive justifications for vertical restraints rather than relying on generalized claims of their theoretical advantages. Graphic Prod. Distrib., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1983); Eiberger v.
Sony Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980). In both cases the courts upheld verdicts for
the plaintiffs. Courts should always make such careful and specific analyses when deciding if a
vertical restraint enhances competition on the merits.
136. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
137. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1553 (1984); Shop &
Save Food Mkt., Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038
(1982); Carps, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39, 45 (5th Cir. 1976).
138. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
139. See id. at 6; Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 33 VAD. L. REV. 283, 287-88 (1980); Slawson, A Stronger Simpler, Tie-In
Doctrine, 25 ANTIRUST BULL. 671, 677 (1980).
140. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 446; Bauer, supra note 139, at 287-88.
141. See Bauer, supra note 139, at 294-96, 302-03.
142. See id. at 288-90; Slawson, supra note 139, at 676; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 38, at 448.
Other commentators have, however, questioned whether the first three effects actually occur.
They have also challenged the relevancy of protecting consumer sovereignty in antitrust law.
See, e.g., Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957);
Note, An Analysis of Tying Arrangments: Invalidating the Leveraging Hypothesis, 61 Tx L.
REV. 893 (1983) (both challenging the leveraging hypothesis); Baker, supra note 5, at 1274
(challenging the relevance of protecting buyer sovereignty as an objective of antitrust law).
Contra Bauer, supra note 139, at 298-99; Slawson, supra note 139, at 85-90 (both defending the
leverage theory).
143. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947). Accord Slawson, supra note 139, at 680-81.
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of avoiding competition on the basis of product quality. Second, to
the extent that the tie-in is successful in maximizing revenues in the
short run, the firm may learn the dangerously erroneous lesson that
quality production can be achieved so long as the firm has a particularly desirable product to which inferior goods can be tied.
Two United States Supreme Court decisions, United States Steel
Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises, Inc. [Fortner 1]'4 and United States
Steel Corp. v. FortnerEnterprises,Inc. [Fortner11]145 may provide
an example of the deleterious effect of tie-ins on competition on the
merits. The Fortner litigation involved a claim that United States
Steel illegally tied the sale of prefabricated homes to the granting of
extremely favorable credit terms. The homes sold by U.S. Steel were
of very poor quality.1 4 6 Indeed, these construction problems may have
triggered the Fortner suit. 47 The Supreme Court ultimately held the
plaintiff had failed to establish a per se violation of the antitrust laws
because U.S. Steel lacked market power in the credit market. 148 In
Fortner I, the four dissenting justices argued that U.S. Steel's
favorable credit terms were not separate products but merely price
reductions inseparable from the homes themselves. 49 If these dissenters were correct, then U.S. Steel was possibly competing on the
merits of its product. U.S. Steel may have been selling a poorly made
home at a commensurately cheap price. The prefabricated homes
may have been as well-built as any other homes in the same price
class. 150

Alternatively, if the Supreme Court majority and other commentators are correct in their assertion that U.S. Steel's credit and prefabricated homes were two separate products, 5 ' then the Fortnerlitigation exemplifies the ills of tie-ins. The homes produced by U.S.
Steel had severe quality control problems. 52 To the extent U.S. Steel
144.

Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) [hereinafter

cited as Fortner1].
145.

United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977) [hereinafter

cited as FortnerII].
146. SEC. ANTTRUST L., A.BA., MONOGRAPH No. 8,

VERTIcAL RESTRIcTiONS UPON BUY-RS
LIMITING PURCHASES OF GOODS FROM OTHERS 33 n.190 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA MONOGRAPH No. 8]; Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower Nor

Lender Be", 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 1, 6-7.
147. A-BA MONOGRAPH No. 8, supra note 146, at 33 n.190; Dam, supra note 146, at 7-8.
148. FortnerII, 429 U.S. 610 (1977).
149. Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 510-20 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 520-25 (Fortas, J.,

dissenting).
150.

Quality and price are, of course, a continuum. See Slawson, supra note 64, at 39.

Consumers do not expect the same level of quality from a $6,000 Chevrolet Chevette as they do
from a $100,000 Rolls Royce.
151.
152.

See Bauer, supra note 139, at 322; Slawson, supra note 139, at 698-99.
See authorities cited supra note 146.
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was allowed to promote the homes through a tie-in with favorable
credit terms, it learned the wrong lesson. It learned that the way to
obtain competitive success was not through product innovation and
quality but through tying the sale of a palpably flawed product to the
purchase of a particularly desirable commodity. The manufacture of
the defective homes may well have been archetypical of the business
tactics which have proven so disastrous in the face of quality-conscious foreign competition. 5 '
Regardless of how one views the current debate over the per se
status of tie-ins, 1 4 the policy of improving product quality through
promotion of competition on the merits strongly suggests that some
tying arrangements should remain subject to per se condemnation.
Specifically, tie-ins which meet the following criteria should retain a
per se classification:
(a) the tie-ins would be deemed per se illegal under present
standards;' 5 5 (b) the firm imposing the tie has some form of
control over the quality of the tied product, usually in the
form of production of the product, but perhaps in the form of
a choice in deciding whether to distribute the product; and (c)
the tied product is in some way inferior in value or quality to
its foreign or domestic competitors.
The last two requirements are logical offshoots of the policy of promoting product quality through competition on the merits. If a firm
has no real control over the quality of the tied product, prohibiting a
tie-in to another product would not force the firm to produce a better
product. Similarly, if the firm imposing the tie-in is already producing a high quality tied product, forcing the firm to abandon the tie-in
may well be gilding the lily.
153. This point perhaps answers the question why the courts should care whether United
States Steel chose to improve its prefabricated homes sales by granting liberalized credit terms
rather than by reducing its price or improving its quality. See Jones, The Two Faces of Fortner: Comment on a Recent Antitrust Opinion, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 39, 44 (1978). This article
contends that American industry's decision to eschew the latter approaches in favor of tactics
such as tie-ins has led to disaster both for industry and the American economy.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 139-42.
155. One commentator succinctly summarizes the requirements for a tie-in to be a per se
violation as follows:
Tying arrangements may be per se illegal under this provision, absent one of the defenses discussed below, if four elements are present: (1) there is a sale or agreement to
sell one product conditioned on the purchase of another; (2) there are two separate products; (3) the seller has sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product to
enable it to restrain trade in the market for the tied product; and (4) the arrangement
affects a not insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied product market.
ABA MONOGRAPH No. 8, supra note 146, at 1-2.
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Tie-ins are a somewhat peculiar per se category of antitrust violation because antitrust courts recognize preservation of a firm's goodwill as a defense to tie-ins.156 This defense is, however, fully consistent with the goal of promoting product quality through competition
on the merits. A leading case, DehydratingProcess Co. v. A.O. Smith
Corp.,1'5 7 illustrates this point. The defendant in DehydratingProcess
refused to sell a patented silo unloading device unless the purchaser
also purchased the seller's glass lined silo. The defendant implemented the requirement because almost half the customers who
bought other silos complained that the loaders did not function properly. The defendant's investigation into the problem had revealed
that the silos made by other firms were either not designed to work
with the loader or were not capable of being properly installed by the
purchasers. 58 A directed verdict for the defendant was upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.1 59 In Dehydrating Process the defendant successfully demonstrated that the tie was
necessary for it to compete on the merits of its loader, i.e., the silo
was indispensable to making a quality loader. The First Circuit quite
sensibly recognized that there is no antitrust violation under these
circumstances.
Competition on the merits is not a talismanic formula which will
resolve all questions in the law of tie-ins. For example, application of
the doctrine did not resolve whether the credit terms and prefabricated houses in the prolonged Fortner ligitgation were one or two
products.1 60 The doctrine does, however, provide a real-world justification for defining some tie-ins as per se antitrust violations.
VI. MONOPOLIZATION

Section 2 of the Sherman Act forbids the monopolization or attempted monopolization of any part of interstate or foreign trade or
commerce.10 ' The offense of monopolization has two elements. The
first element is the possession of monopoly power, i.e., the power to
unilaterally raise prices and exclude competitors.16 2 Without the second element of "willfully" attaining, maintaining, or extending this
power, the mere possession of monopoly power is not enough to es156. Dehydrating Process v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653, 655 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935), a)f'd
per curiam, 299 U.S. 3 (1936).
157. 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961).

158. Id. at 654-56.
159. Id. at 656-57.
160.
161.
162.

See supra notes 9-51 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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tablish the offense of monopolization.1 6 s Judicial construction of the
willfulness element of monopolization does not refer to a subjective
mental state of defendants. Instead, courts have interpreted "willful"
as engaging in some form of "monopolizing" conduct which contrib16
utes to the attainment of monopoly power. 1
The issue of what constitutes monopolizing conduct is perhaps
the central dispute in the modern law of monopolization, and the
concept of competition on the merits has a firmly established place in
that dispute. Courts and commentators have agreed that competition
on the merits and conduct necessary for such competition should not
be construed as monopolizing conduct. 1 5 This consensus dissolves,
however, when issues involving the scope of competition on the merits are addressed. For example, the dispute over when low prices become predatory is basically a debate over the precise boundaries of
competition on the merits. 6 Another example of this debate is the
dispute over whether the introduction of new products is innovation
in response to consumer demand or is meaningless product prolifera67
tion designed to exclude rivals from the market.
Courts and commentators have also been divided over what business conduct is necessary for competition on the merits. The battle in
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' 68 over whether Kodak
was required to disclose film innovations to its competitors is an example of the difficulty of ascertaining precisely when a business act
or practice is necessary for competition on the merits. 6 9 While the
163. Id.
164. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW T 626(a) (1978).
165. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230 (1st Cir. 1983);
Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 1315 (1984); 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 164, at I 626(b).
166. The body of scholarly literature and court decisions on what constitutes predatory
pricing is massive. For particularly useful summaries of the major scholarly works and court
cases see Hurwitz & Kovacic, Judicial Analysis of Predation:The Emerging Trends, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 63 (1982); Broadley & Hay, PredatoryPricing: Competing Economic Theories and the
Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 738 (1981).
167. Compare Bailey's Bakery Ltd. v. Continental Baking Co., 235 F. Supp. 705 (D. Haw.
1964), aff'd per curiam, 401 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969) (holding that diversification of bread types might be monopolizing conduct for purposes of section 2
of the Sherman Act) with California Computer Prod., Inc. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp.,
613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (upholding design changes by IBM). For a discussion of innovation
as monopolizing conduct see Hurwitz & Kovacic, supra note 166, at 113-17.
168. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
169. In Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) the plaintiff claimed that Kodak was engaged in a number of monopolizing practices. One of the alleged acts of monopolizing conduct was that Kodak had not
predisclosed its revolutionary new 110 format film to its competitors in the camera market.
Berkey alleged that Kodak was attempting to use its monopoly position in the film market to
gain a monopoly in the camera market. Berkey maintained that predisclosure was necessary to
give competing camera manufacturers an opportunity to develop cameras which would accept
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discussions with respect to the nature and extent of competition on
the merits are interesting, they are outside the scope of this article
because the participants implicitly concede the article's basic premise
the centrality of competition on the merits to the law of monopolization. The disputants are battling over the exact nature of competition on the merits, a topic outside the parameters of this article.
Another dispute over the relationship between competition on the
merits and monopolizing conduct is what actions beyond competition
on the merits can competitors undertake without having engaged in
monopolizing conduct. This dispute merits detailed attention because
an overly broad resolution of the issues in favor of a monopolist can
undermine the entire utility of competition on the merits in the law
of monopolization. For purposes of determining whether conduct is
monopolistic, business practices can be placed on a continuum with
three basic divisions. At one end of the continuum is competition on
the merits and conduct necessary for such competition. As already
noted, such conduct is not generally deemed to be monopolizing conduct. 170 At the other end of the spectrum is predatory conduct, such
as violence directed at a competitor, business torts, and violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. If a plaintiff can establish a causal link
between a firm's predatory conduct and its attainment, maintenance
in
or extension of monopoly power, she will experience no difficulty
171
proving that the defendant engaged in monopolizing conduct.
Courts and commentators have the most difficulty in determining
how to treat the middle area of formal business conduct between the
two extremes of competition on the merits and predation. For example, a shoe machinery firm with an overwhelming share of the shoe
machinery market, may choose to make its product available solely
on a lease basis.172 Another example of normal business conduct
might be when an already dominant firm engages in a massive advertising campaign vastly larger than any -other previously attempted in
the industry.173 The size of the campaign may go beyond conceivable
need to impart information to consumers. Instead, the campaign may
Kodak's desirable new film format. The trial court allowed the jury to find that the failure to
predisclose was an act of monopolizing conduct. Id. at 281. The Court of Appeals reversed on
this point. Id. at 279-85.
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
171. See generally 16B B. VoN KANowsKI ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATiON
§ 8.02[4][b] (1981).
172. Cf. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
afld per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (suggesting that a lease only policy is an act of monopolizing conduct).
173. Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 287 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (suggesting in dictum that an advertising campaign "unwarranted
by competitive exigencies" might be monopolizing conduct).
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be designed to create in the minds of consumers a complete identification of the product with the advertised brand.
Neither of the above examples of normal business conduct involve
conduct which would in any ordinary sense be considered predatory.
If a nonmonopolist engaged in this conduct, competitors would probably not object. However, the practices described above cannot be
equated with competition on the merits, i.e. competing through the
improvement of product quality. The point of contention is the extent to which a firm with monopoly power may cross the line between
competition on the merits and enter into the gray area of normal
business conduct.
At least one court, the Tenth Circuit in Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp.,174 has implied that a monopolist can
engage in any form of normal business conduct without being considered to be monopolizing a relevant market. 17 5 Other circuits have not
clearly indicated whether they would allow monopolists as much leeway as the Tenth Circuit. 176 If encouraging the improvement of product quality through competition on the merits is to succeed, however,
an approach exactly opposite that of the Tenth Circuit must be
adopted. The monopolist should be prohibited from engaging in competition not on the merits, even if the practice is considered "normal
business conduct."
In American business, reliance on quick fix tactics such as product
image creation and elaborate distribution networks rather than product quality is unfortunately normal business conduct.177 As discussed
above, this conduct has proven to be dysfunctional in the face of
quality conscious foreign competition and should be discouraged by
the antitrust laws. 178 If noncompetition on the merits, whether or not
it constitutes normal business conduct, is defined as monopolizing
conduct, the monopolist or putative monopolist will have strong incentive to eschew such conduct. The monopolist will also have strong
incentive to compete on the merits of his products by improving their
quality.' 79 Thus, the monopolist or would be monopolist who is faced
174. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
175. Id. at 928.
176. See Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases and the Transformation of the Law, 60 Tax. L. REV. 587, 619 (1982) (discussing antitrust decisions from the
Second Circuit).
177. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
178. See id.
179. The implication of the text is, of course, that the so-called "no-fault" monopolization
proposals, which, in government injunctive actions, would eliminate the conduct requirement in
the face of persistent monopoly power, should be rejected on the grounds that such proposals
might discourage improvement of product quality through competition on the merits. For a
discussion of the conduct requirement in antitrust actions see, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
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with the choice of attaining market dominance either through a massive advertising campaign or through product innovation and costsaving efficiencies should be compelled to adopt the latter strategy.
The Tenth Circuit's liberal standard of allowing a monopolist to pursue any normal business conduct will not attain this objective. Restricting a monopolist to competition on *the merits will attain the
objective.180
VII. LIMITATIONS OF COMPETITION ON THE MERITS

Clearly limits on both what competition on the merits can accomplish and what it should accomplish exist. Competition on the merits
is not a magic charm which will resolve all antitrust law issues. As
discussed above, the concept is of little help in determining questions
such as whether more than one product exists in an alleged tie-in.181
Moreover, this limitation is complicated by the occasional difficulty
courts have in ascertaining whether a particular business practice
constitutes competition on the merits or conduct necessary for such
182
competition.

The most important limitation on the concept of competition on
the merits, however, is that not every act of competition other than
on the merits which injures a competitor should be considered a violation of the federal antitrust laws. Several reasons for this limitation
exist. First, if this limitation were not applied, the antitrust laws
would eventually subsume much of state unfair trade practice law, a
THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESDENT AND THE ATrORNEY
GENERAsL, 339 (1978) (separate view of Commissioner Fox); 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra

note 164, at %623. This rejection is not, however, categorical. The no-fault monopolization proposals do not require instantaneous dissolution of monopolies, only the dissolution of persistent
monopolies. As Professor Eleanor Fox has pointed out, a moiopolist, like the holder of a patent, will be able to enjoy a limited time monopoly. Fox, Monopoly and Competition: Tilting
the Law Toward a More Competitive Economy, 37 WASH. & LzE L. REv. 49, 58 (1980). The
ability to enjoy this limited time monopoly may provide the monopolist with sufficient incentive to continue product innovation and improvement. Professors Areeda and Turner point to a
number of other incentives for innovation, such as the desire to keep ahead of potential competition. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNEt,supra note 164, at I 622b. If these assertions are accurate,
then a monopolist may still have an incentive to compete on the merits of his products even
under a no-fault monopoly system.
180. This is not to say that an antitrust court will have an easy time deciding whether
business conduct constitutes competition on the merits or conduct necessary for such competition. See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text. However, once a court draws a line and
decides that conduct is not competition on the merits, it should be considered monopolizing
conduct if the conduct played a causal role in the attainment, maintenance or extension of the
defendant's monopoly power.
181. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. See also supra text accompanying
note 160.
182. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1984

31

Florida Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 4 [1984], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVI

result Congress did not envision when it passed the antitrust laws. 183
Second, allowing every instance of competition not on the merits to
give rise to a federal cause of action would swamp the federal
courts. 84 Third, some instances of noncompetition on the merits simply do not seem to warrant action under the antitrust laws. The manner in which the small manufacturer of "Formula 409" bested Proctor and Gamble in the spray cleaner market may be a good
illustration of this point.
Wilson Harrell was the manufacturer of "Formula 409," a popular
spray cleaner. Harrell learned that Proctor and Gamble ("P & G"),
the nation's largest manufacturer of laundry products, was interested
in marketing a competitive spray cleaner called "Cinch" and that P
& G would use Denver as a test market for the product.8 5 Harrell
deliberately inflated P & G's expectations for Cinch by subtly pulling
Formula 409 out of the Denver market while Cinch was being testmarketed. When P & G began marketing Cinch nationally, Harrell
offered huge bargains on Formula 409 which encouraged consumers
to buy about a six months supply of the formula.8 6 Sales of Cinch
were extremely poor because consumers already had more spray
cleaner than they could possibly use. In light of Cinch's spectacular
debut in Denver, P & G was especially discouraged by the product's
subsequent poor sales performance. P & G withdrew Cinch from the
8 7
market within a year of its introduction.
The conduct of Wilson Harrell did not constitute competition on
the merits. Harrell did not make a better spray cleaner than P & G
nor did he offer a better value through manufacturing efficiency. Indeed, Harrell's bargain Formula 409 offer was probably a form of
predatory pricing. 8 8 Moreover, P & G, despite its huge size, did suf183. Note, Per Se Legality, supra note 89, at 420-21.
184. If every injury to a competitor caused by competition not on the merits gave rise to a
federal antitrust law violation, most. state unfair competition suits would be brought in federal
court as antitrust suits. The incentive for bringing suits in the federal forum is the award of
attorney fees. The Clayton Act expressly allows the award of attorney fees to successful antitrust plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982). In contrast, many states do not, as a general rule,
allow plaintiffs in successful unfair competition suits to recover attorney fees from their opponents. Whann & Clevenger, Attorney Fees in Trademark and Unfair Competition Litigation,
71 TRADE-MARK REP. 550, 553 (1981).

185. P.

SOLMAN

& T.

FRIEDMAN, LIFE AND DEATH ON THE CORPORATE BATTLEFIELD

26

(1982).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 27.
188. See authorities cited supra note 166. Moreover, if Harrell had been a monopolist his
conduct might have been deemed to be exclusionary monopolizing conduct. Cf. Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836
(1974) (holding that blanketing an area with free products evidences a specific intent to
monopolize).
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fer an injury. Nonetheless, one has an almost intuitive feeling, perhaps based upon a populist sympathy for the "small" firm battling
the industry "giant," that Mr. Harrell's conduct should not be
deemed an antitrust law violation. 18 9
Two tools prevent antitrust law from subsuming state unfair competition law and general business ethics. The first tool is the existing
body of antitrust rules, such as the concerted action requirement of
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The concerted action requirement
might prevent antitrust laws from becoming all encompassing 9" by
allowing the nonmonopolist, like Mr. Harrell, to use "dirty tricks" to
foil a competitor without automatically violating section 1 of the
Sherman Act. 19'
The second source of limitations on competition on the merits is
the other values which the antitrust laws are designed to promote
such as the preservation of consumer sovereignty and the dispersion
of economic and political power.'9 2 A requirement that a practice
which is not competition on merits impinge on one of the above values in order to be deemed an antitrust violation would prevent the
doctrine of competition on the merits from infinitely expanding the
reach of antitrust laws. 93 A failure to compete on the merits should
189. Cf. Redlich, supra note 2, at 23. Professor Redlich exhibits a marked reluctance to
view the plaintiff in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), as a "monopolist":
In Albrecht, a newspaper established a distribution system whereby distributors such as
Albrecht had exclusive routes. In microeconomic terms Albrecht was a monopolist. He
had the power to price set because competitors could not enter his territory due to his
contractual right to the exclusive use of that territory. Viewed realistically, Albrecht was
a small entrepreneur with a very small capital investment who worked from dawn to
dusk delivering newspapers from his truck. When Albrecht raised prices to increase his
income the newspaper publisher attempted to force him to lower his prices, and failing,
forced him out of business.
Redlich, supra note 2, at 23.
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The term "concerted action" is a shorthand method of
referring to section 1 of the Sherman Act's requirement of a "contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy." Id. For a general discussion of the concerted action requirement, see L. SuLLivAN,
supra note 38, at 311-29.
191. Using the concerted action requirement as a limitation is problematic because the
Supreme Court, in dicta, has watered down the requirement in terms of the potential parties to
an agreement almost to the point of becoming meaningless. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 150 (1968). However, proving the existence of an agreement can still be an insurmountable task. See, e.g., Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th
Cir. 1982).
192. For some recent discussion on the role of non-economic values in the antitrust laws,
see generally Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv.
1140 (1981); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1076 (1979); Flynn, Antitrust Jurisprudence: A Symposium on the Economic, Political
and Social Goals of Antitrust Policy, 125 .U. PA. L. REV. 1182 (1977).
193. Non-economic goals are of vital importance in the antitrust laws. See supra note 192.
This article demonstrates that the pursuit of these goals does not, as some critics assert, always
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be a necessary but not sufficient condition for an antitrust law
94
violation.1
VIII.

VALIDITY OF COMPETITION ON THE MERITS AS A POLICY TOOL

It is possible to agree that American management must learn to
compete on the merits of their products but to disagree that antitrust
laws are needed as incentives to make them do so. Those who espouse this position would probably argue that American management
is basically rational and wishes to ensure the survival of its firms.
Therefore, if competition on the basis of product quality is really required to compete successfully against foreign producers, then American management will adopt that strategy without prodding through
the antitrust laws.
A number of logical flaws undermine this optimistic forecast.
First, American management may not recognize poor quality as the
cause of America's industrial malaise.' 9 Second, American management is not accustomed to working in an environment where product
quality is a positive competitive factor. As discussed previously,
product quality has not been a significant factor in some markets. 96
Indeed, as one commentator points out, deliberate product degradation has proven to be quite useful to firms in implementing hidden
price increases in inflationary markets. 97 Given this history, managers may not recognize the need for product quality improvement even
though such improvement is crucial now that American firms are
faced with quality conscious foreign competition. 198
Third, even if management recognizes the need to focus on product quality, it may still be reluctant to change its current practices.
American management is notorious for its unwillingness to engage in
ventures which will not yield substantial short-term rewards.19 9 This
tendency is exacerbated by a similar outlook in American capital
entail an economic loss. See 1 P. ARiEEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 164, at § 111-112 (asserting
that "populist" goals too often conflict with efficiency considerations). Furthermore, the pursuit
of the non-economic goals is often consistent with actions necessary for long-run economic
prosperity.
194. In a sense, competition on the merits is a counter-argument to claims, often based on
microeconomic models, that various restraints are efficient and promote consumer welfare.
195. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 29-32 and acompanying text.
197. W. SLAWSON, supra note 04, at 62-63.
198. Id. at 630. Professor Slawson points out that product degradation can work as a
strategy only as long as the rest of the industry follows suit. Id. The refusal of foreign firms to
compete on a non-quality basis has emasculated the degradation strategy. In effect, the rest of
the industry is not following suit.
199. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
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raising markets.20 0 Competition on the merits and improvement of
product quality may be unattractive options to management because
they may not yield immediate returns which will improve the short
run bottom line performance of the firm. In fact, competition
through improvement of product may, in the short run, hurt
"performance."
An example consisting of two hypothetical firms illustrates this
point. One firm devotes substantial resources to research and development for new products or to new production processes. The other
firm does not. In the long run, the former firm will be better able to
meet the challenge of foreign competition through quality products.
In the short run, however, the management of the latter firm may be
seen as performing better because its short term profits and dividends may be boosted by the firm's failure to make needed investments in future production.2 1 Managers may be unwilling to concentrate on competing through product quality for fear of being labeled
inadequate performers under the prevailing management and capital
market ethos. In this sense the interests of a firm and its management may well be divergent.
Another reason management may choose not to improve product
quality is that this move might force management to give up prerogatives which it has traditionally taken for granted. A growing body of
evidence suggests that product quality depends both on worker's involvement in the production process and management's willingness
to learn from its workers. 0 2 Evidence also suggests that the creation
of blatant class distinctions between management and labor, such as
vast salary disparities and executive dining rooms, and the perpetuation of a "management knows best" attitude hinders product quality
improvement.20 3 Once again the interests of a firm and its management may diverge. Managers may be unwilling to concentrate on
product quality if that means surrendering fringe benefits or decisional authority. Therefore, external incentives, such as the antitrust
laws, are needed to prod firms into taking the steps necessary for
their long term survival against foreign competition.
Opponents of using antitrust law to spur product quality may also
argue that even if American firms fail to compete on the merits, the
200. Fallows, supra note 19, at 45; cf. B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, THE DEmDusTRmAIZATION OF AMERCA 194-50 (1982) (noting fixation of capital raising markets with high stock
price to earnings ratios and an overemphasis on cash management as opposed to commitment

to product lines).
201.
202.

See R REICH, supra note 21, at 164.
See T. PETERS & R. WATrmmm, supra note 12, at 235-38; Pascarella, supra note 25,

at 55.
203.

See Abernathy, Clark & Kantrow, supra note 14, at 91-92 and supra note 202.
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results will not be disastrous from the consumers' point of view. If
quality conscious foreign firms capture American markets, neither
price nor output will necessarily be adversely affected. All that will
occur is the substitution of efficient quality conscious foreign producers for American producers. However, this view does not acknowledge
that the failure of American firms, would adversely impact both the
economy and those workers employed by failed firms.
If foreign competitors capture sector after sector of the economy,
what will be left for the United States? As one economist has stated:
The idea that America can give up on manufacturing (let the
Japanese make our computers) and rescue ourselves with services (we will do the programming) is simply nonsense. In the
long run the people who build the hardware are going to dominate the software, and in any case America needs those hardware jobs. . . American firms can retreat to the second-class
status of being importers of foreign-made products if they
wish, but America cannot afford to retreat with them.0 4
A shrinking competitive market will ultimately result in a corresponding decline in the American standard of living. The failure of
American firms with concommitant unemployment, plant closings,
and economic dislocations has both short term and long-term economic and social costs. Plant closings and unemployment have been
linked to increased incidence of crime, mental and physical violence,
and intrafamilial violence.2 0 5 Even if these manifestations were not
objectionable on humanitarian grounds, they are economically objectionable because they represent a dead-weight economic loss which
will eventually diminish the American standard of living.20 6 The argument that the supplanting of American firms by foreign firms is
irrelevant ignores these very real and painful costs.
IX. CONCLUSION
The policy of using antitrust laws in order to force American firms
to emphasize product quality seems both radical and ironic. The policy seems radical because it is a decision by government that competition on the merits through an emphasis on product quality is supe07
rior to other business strategies which firms may wish to adopt.
204. Thurow, Down Without a Fight, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 67.
205. B. BLUESTON & B. HARRISON, supra note 200, at 63-66.
206. See The Social Costs of Unemployment: Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (opening statement of the
Hon. Parren J. Mitchell); B. BLUESTONE & R. HARRISON, supra note 200, at 289 n.47.
207. The traditional reluctance of government to interfere in a firm's choice of business
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This policy also calls for the government, through the antitrust laws,
to induce firms to adopt its preferred business strategy. While the
policy may be highly interventionist, it is an almost inevitable consequence of the role of economic efficiency in the antitrust laws.
A decades long debate has raged over whether allocative economic
efficiency should be the exclusive goal of antitrust laws.2 0 As long as
economic efficiency is to play any role in determining that a practice
is not a violation of the antitrust laws, however, society should be
able to determine the legitimacy of the economic claim. A business
practice which is dysfunctional in the face of foreign competition,
should not be allowed under antitrust laws merely because it has
some theoretical economic efficiencies. Any economic theory which
purports to be scientific must meet the ultimate test of comporting
with empirical reality.2 09 A business practice is not efficient if it
proves to be disastrous in the face of foreign competition, no matter
what "efficiencies" it generates on paper through neo-classical price
210
theory.
The idea that competition on the merits should be a guiding value
of antitrust law seems ironic because one of its objectives appears to
be the protection of antitrust violators from themselves. Ultimately,
however, the policy of promoting competition on the merits is not
designed to protect violators, but to protect the American economy.
The failure of American firms has widespread negative consequences
for both individuals and the economy as a whole. 1 1 As economist
Lester Thurow has stated:
strategy and tactics is best exemplified by the business judgment rule. The business judgment
rule provides that "directors of a corporation are not liable for losses arising from mere errors
of judgment if they acted in good faith and with due care." Lewis, The Business Judgment
Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 158
(1970). The rationale for the rule is that "the shareholders have selected the directors, and
therefore the courts are not justified in substituting their judgment for that of managers selected by owners." Id. at 157.
208. Compare, e.g., authorities cited supra note 192 (arguing for non-economic values in
antitrust law) with e.g., R BOR, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (arguing that non-economic values
ought to be irrelevant in antitrust law).
209. See Nagel, Theory and Observation,in OBSERVATION AND THEORY INSCIENCE 15-16
(M. Mandelbaum ed. 1971).
210. Microeconomic theory may be incapable of dealing with the considerations raised in
this article. This article emphasizes the importance of individual business decisions and strategies. These factors are incapable of fitting into models which perceive firms as uniform profit
maximizing entities and limit model variables to use, supply, demand, output, and price. Indeed, a number of economists have recently begun to challenge the overall utility of
microeconomics in predicting real-world firm or individual behavior. L. THuRow, DANGEROUS
CuRRErs 217-22 (1983); Liebenstein, Microeconomics and X-Efficiency Theory, in THE Cis
IN EcONowc THEORY 97 (D. Bell & L Kristol eds. 1981) (emphasizing both the importance of
non-quantifiable individual preferences and business predilections).
211. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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We tend to excuse stupid private actions on the ground that
the agents making the mistakes are wasting their own resources and that therefore their mistakes are their business.
To some extent this is true, although it does not change the
fact that all decision makers make mistakes. But to a very
substantial extent, it is also not true. Managers of large corporations are not making mistakes with their own money. Both
they and the government bureaucrats are playing the economic game with someone else's money. Whenever private or
public managers makes mistakes, they are going to be wasting
someone else's money. And in general, it is much easier for a
voter to replace a poor public manager than it is for a shareholder to replace a poor private manager.2 12
Promoting product quality and competition on the merits through
antitrust laws is not a panacea which will cure all of the United
States' economic ills. It is merely one tool among many.213 It is, however, a tool which can be used to influence business to take the necessary steps which will enable them, and the American economy, to
survive the onslaught of foreign competition which we are now
experiencing.

212.

L.

THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE PossIBILrrEs FOR Eco-

132 (1980).
213. See, e.g., R. REICH, supra note 21, at 241-43; B. BLUESTONE & B. HARRISON, supra
note 200, at 126-29, 233-34 (emphasizing the importance of reforming tax structures in encouraging economic revitalization).
NOMIC CHANGE
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